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This paper estimates the distributive and regional effects of firms with market power in 
the case of Mexico. It presents evidence that the welfare losses due to the exercise of 
monopoly power are not only significant, but also regressive. Moreover, the losses are 
different for the urban and rural sectors, as well as for each of the states of Mexico, being 
the inhabitants of the poorest ones the most affected by firms with market power. 
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“Despite the primary concern of economists with the resource allocation 
effects of market arrangements, political officials are more often concerned 
with distributive effects”. Comanor and Smiley (1975, p. 194). 
 
At first glance it would seem natural to surmise that the welfare effects caused by firms 
with a significant market power would vary according to the consumers’ income, or even 
according to the regions where the firms sell their products; the latter especially in the 
case of developing countries, where transportation costs tend to be high and consumers 
are typically poorly informed. Nevertheless, there have been very few studies that explore 
in detail the distributional consequences of monopoly power in any economy, whether 
developed or underdeveloped. Among the general studies known to us are those of 
Comanor and Smiley (1975), McKenzie (1983), and Creedy and Dixon (1998 and 1999); 
while Hausman and Sidak (2004) explore the same issue for the particular case of long-
distance phone calls. In all those studies the verdict is the same: market power has a 
significant distributive impact. In the case of Australia, for instance, Creedy and Dixon 
(1998, p. 285) conclude that “whatever the size of the absolute welfare loss arising from 
monopoly, there may be a substantial effect on the distribution of welfare”. 
  Our work not only follows those authors in analyzing the distributive impact of 
firms with a significant market power, this time in the case of Mexico, but it also deals 
with their regional effects. In order to accomplish this last task, we distinguish between 
households living in urban and rural areas, and we calculate afterwards the welfare losses 
due to market power for each of the thirty two Mexican states. Section 1 presents the 
theoretical model to be used to estimate those welfare losses, which is based on the 
assumption of oligopolies with conjectural variations. Section 2 details the household   4
expenditure survey that is used in the paper, as well as the markets under study. These are 
chosen according to two criteria: a presumption, from the part of the Mexican Federal 
Competition Commission, that there could be market power from the part of the sellers, 
and the availability of data on, both, households’ spending and unit values. 
  Since the expenditure surveys that are officially made in Mexico are not 
longitudinal, it is not permissible to regard the reported unit values as prices. Strictly 
speaking, those values reflect not only commodity prices but also the quality of them. 
Thus, Section 3 uses the ingenious model of spatial variations proposed by Deaton (1987 
and 1990) to circumvent that problem. Once the price elasticities of the demand for the 
goods are estimated for both the urban and the rural sectors, the distributional and spatial 
effects on social welfare are finally estimated in Section 4. 
 
I. MEASURING WELFARE LOSSES DUE TO MARKET POWER 
 
In this part we present the theoretical model that is used in a later section to estimate the 
distributional consequences of market power. It is assumed from the beginning that the 
social welfare cost of market power can be represented by the loss of consumers’ surplus. 
Although it is well known that welfare losses are much better estimated using utility-
based measures, such as equivalent variations, these measures cannot be calculated here. 
This is so because, as explained in Section 3 below, the econometric model that is used in 
this paper to estimate the own-price elasticities is not a bona fide demand system, since it 
is not derived from a utility function.   5
  Given a particular good, let 
m p  be the price charged to households by the firms 
with market power. We assume that the marginal cost of the supplier, cm, is constant and 
equal to the competitive price that would prevail under perfect competition,  .
c p  As in 
Creedy and Dixon (1998), we further assume that the demand curve can be approximated 











Denoting by η  the elasticity of the demand for the good relative to its own price, then 
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  In order to calculate (3), we require not only an estimate of the elasticity, but also 
of the amount spent on the good, which can be obtained from a survey, and the estimated   6
increase in relative prices due to market power, which depends on the particular industrial 
structure prevailing in the market. Following Creedy and Dixon (1999), we assume here 
that the industries under study are made of oligopolies with conjectural variations. 
  More formally, consider an oligopoly that is constituted by K firms, all of them 
producing the same homogeneous good. Let Q be the total production of the industry, 
which is the sum of the production by firm k, denoted by  k q , and the aggregate 
production from the rest of the firms, denoted by  k q− . Assuming that all the firms base 
their decisions according to the conjectural variations hypothesis, the optimality condition 
for each firm k is given by: 
 
 














where  k cm  is the marginal cost for firm k, which is assumed to be constant, while  k η  is 
the demand elasticity as perceived by the firm. The following expressions establish the 
relationship between this last elasticity and the market elasticity: 
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The denominator on the right-hand side of (5) can be written as 
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  Let us define the conjectural elasticity  ) / /( ) / ( k k k k k q dq q dq − − ≡ α , which 
measures the degree to which firm k takes into account its rivals’ reactions to its own 
changes in production. Using  k α , and inserting (7) in (5), we can obtain the firm’s 
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Assuming now that, for all firms,  θ θ = k  and 
c
k p cm =  (conditions that would be fulfilled 
in particular if all firms were identical), then, after substituting (8) in (4), we can find that 
the price margin due to market power can be expressed as: 
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  Note that this last equation just requires an estimate of the price elasticity and the 
spending on each good, once the value of θ is established. It equals one in the case of a 
monopoly, but the value depends in general on both the market shares and the conjectural 
elasticities. If we further assume that the conjectural responses correspond to the Cournot 
model, as we do in a later section, then  0 = α  and, by (8), θ is simply equal to K. Also 
note that for the optimality condition in (4) to make sense, it is necessary that  1 − < k η , 
since the marginal cost is always positive. This requires that  k θ η / 1 − < , which, in the 
case of identical firms in a Cournot game, implies in turn that  K / 1 − < η . 
  Finally, in order to be able to establish comparisons across groups of individuals, 
it is convenient to rescale the welfare loss given in (10). Let M be the number of goods 
purchased by the consumers from firms with market power. A measure of the total 
welfare loss in relative terms can be found after dividing the welfare loss on each item by 















where  i w  is the share of good i in total expenditure. 
 
II. DATA AND MARKETS UNDER STUDY 
 
The household income and expenditure survey to be used here is known in Mexico as the 
Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares, ENIGH for short. The most 
recent ENIGH that was available at the moment of this writing was made in August-
November 2006 (INEGI, 2007). The sample consisted of 20,875 housing units, and it was 
designed to provide reliable estimates at the national level, as well as at the urban and 
rural levels (the urban sector consists of all localities with 2,500 or more inhabitants, and 
the rural sector of the rest); furthermore, the 2006 survey was also representative for 
some, but not all, of the 32 Mexican states. For reasons to be given in a later section, it is 
important to add that the sampling process was stratified and multi-staged. Each primary 
sampling unit was made of one or several “basic geostatistical areas” (these are similar to 
the census tracts employed in other countries). The resulting 2,785 primary sampling 
units were subject to a stratification based on socio-demographic variables to finally 
produce 392 strata from which the sample was drawn.   10
  Turning now to the markets to be studied, their selection is facilitated by the fact 
that in 2008 the Federal Competition Commission listed a number of sectors that it 
wanted to examine closely (CFC, 2008). The goods mentioned by the Commission that 
are also contemplated in the ENIGH are the following: corn tortilla; processed meats; 
carbonated soft drinks; cow milk; chicken and eggs; beer; medicines; electricity; liquefied 
gas; natural gas; and gasoline. On the other hand, the services included in that list that are 
also recorded in the expenditure survey are: foreign bus transportation; air transportation; 
private primary schools; private high schools; private universities; long-distance phone 
calls; local phone calls; cell phones; internet; medical fees; hospital fees; and credit card 
payments. 
  Even though all the goods and services mentioned above are reported in the 
ENIGH, for most of them there is only information on household spending, not on unit 
values. This is the case for both the services and the energy consumption goods. Since 
this fact prevents us from a direct estimation of their corresponding price elasticities, in 
this paper we focus solely on the following seven consumption goods for which unit 
values are indeed reported: corn tortilla; processed meats (ham, bacon, sausage, etc.); 
carbonated soft drinks (together with juices and bottled water); cow milk; chicken and 
eggs; beer; and medicines (whether purchased with or without a prescription). 
  Having selected the goods markets, it remains to be decided whether or not each 
of them can be treated as a single national market. In our context, this would be so if there 
were no presumption of differing non-competitive practices across all regions in Mexico. 
Although in the case of urban areas there is no such presumption, in the case of rural   11
areas there is evidence of distinctive non-competitive practices. For instance, it is 
common for firms to deliver directly their products to stores in remote areas, but only if 
no other competing brands are offered to the consumers. There are even documented 
cases (CFC, 1998) in which firms have bribed the leaders of communal lands to eject 
competitors from the entire locality. If we add to that evidence the fact that in most rural 
areas there are no shopping outlets nearby that can impose some price discipline, then it 
would seem important to distinguish between the urban and the rural sectors in what 
follows. 
 
III. PRICE AND QUALITY 
 
Since the ENIGH is not a longitudinal survey, but rather a cross-sectional one, we should 
resist the temptation of treating the unit values reported by each household as the goods 
prices faced by the rest of them. This is so because variations in unit values across 
households may be due to changes in the quality of goods purchased; for instance, the 
price difference between two cuts of beef can be quite significant. Furthermore, even if 
the goods are identical, the perceived quality may differ; for example, the lettuce sold in a 
supermarket may be perceived to be cleaner than the one sold in a market street. 
  Although the above comments might be thought to imply that there is no way to 
estimate the own-price elasticities needed in this paper, there is however an indirect 
procedure that can be implemented for that end. The model of spatial variations due to 
Deaton (1987 and 1990) can be used, provided that the unobserved prices do not vary   12
within the clusters used in the sampling process. In the case of the ENIGH this is a 
reasonable assumption, since, as noted earlier, each of its 2,785 primary sampling units 
correspond to a simple geostatistical area, a neighborhood so to speak. Following the 
notation in Deaton (1997), the statistical model to be used is of the form: 
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where: M is the number of goods;  Ghc w  is the share of good G in the budget of household 
h located in cluster c;  hc x  is the household’s total spending;  hc z  is a vector of socio-
demographic variables (and ‘·’ is the inner product);  Hc π  is the price of good H in cluster 
c;  Gc f  is a cluster-level effect (fixed or random) that is uncorrelated with the prices;  Ghc v  
is the unit value of good G as reported by the household h located in cluster c; and 
0
Ghc u  
and 
1
Ghc u  are the correlated stochastic residuals. 
  It is worth noting that the apparent similarity between the model (12)-(13) and the 
popular Almost Ideal Demand system is illusory. At best the model may be viewed as an 
aggregate demand system where “the averaging over agents almost never permits an 
interpretation in terms of a representative agent” (Deaton, 1997, p. 305). An implication 
of this fact is that, as already noted in Section 1, we cannot use in this paper utility-based   13
measures to estimate welfare losses. Another consequence is that a special econometric 
procedure has to be used to estimate the model. 
  Since Deaton (1997, pp. 293-305) has a very detailed exposition of his 
methodology, here we limit ourselves to a short comment. The estimation procedure can 
be divided into two steps. In the first, the within-cluster stage, the two equations (12)-(13) 
are run using ordinary least squares after demeaning, by their cluster means, the budget 
shares, the logarithms of the unit values and of the expenditures, and the socio-
demographic variables. Since prices are constant in each cluster, then, as is well known 
from the literature, that demeaning removes prices and fixed effects, and allows 
consistent estimation of the alphas, betas and gammas. The second step, the between-
cluster stage, is less canonical. First, the consistent estimates of the parameters are used to 
compute averages by cluster of shares and unit values purged of the effects of 
expenditures and socio-demographic characteristics. Second, the first-stage regressions 
are also used to estimate the variance-covariance matrix of the theoretical averages, as 
well as of the variance-covariance matrix of 
0
Ghc u  and 
1
Ghc u . Finally, the elasticity matrix is 
estimated using between-cluster ordinary least squares regressions of average shares on 
average unit values. 
  Our model is estimated along those lines for the seven goods under consideration, 
after adding a number of socio-demographic variables. The first three are the age of the 
head of the household, her years of education, and the number of members of the 
household. The next ten variables are made of the following proportions: of men and 
women in the household that are under 12 years of age; of men and women aged 12 years   14
or older, but under 25 years of age; of men and women aged 25 years or older, but under 
45 years of age; of men and women aged 45 years or older, but under 65 years of age; and 
of men and women aged 65 years or older. Finally, binary variables were also included to 
capture diverse consumption patterns across regions. For that end, the 32 Mexican states 
were divided into four regions: Baja California, Baja California Sur, Coahuila, 
Chihuahua, Durango, Nuevo León, Sinaloa, Sonora and Tamaulipas; Aguascalientes, 
Colima, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Nayarit, San Luis Potosí and Zacatecas; Campeche, 
Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Tabasco, Quintana Roo and Yucatán; and Distrito Federal, 
Hidalgo, México, Michoacán, Morelos, Puebla, Querétaro, Tlaxcala and Veracruz. 
  The estimation results, for both urban and rural households, are presented in Table 
1. As can be appreciated, the point estimates of the own-price elasticities seem to be 
reasonable in both sectors. Only the demand for milk is inelastic, at a level of significance 





     TABLE 1




Corn tortilla -1.389 0.623
Processed meats -0.507 0.103
Chicken and eggs -1.087 0.324
Milk -0.327 0.143




Corn tortilla -0.311 0.105
Processed meat -0.456 0.295
Chicken and eggs -1.559 0.500
Milk -0.394 0.128
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households, while the demand for corn tortilla is also so for rural households (whose diet 
crucially depends on tortilla consumption). Although income elasticities are not included 




IV. DISTRIBUTIONAL AND REGIONAL IMPACTS 
 
This part integrates the theoretical results developed in the first section of the paper with 
the empirical results that have just been presented. As noted earlier, if for each of the 
markets we assume that firms produce a homogeneous product, have identical cost 
functions, and behave as in a Cournot game, then the measure of the total welfare loss in 

















where, it is useful to repeat it here,  i w  is the share of good i in the budget,  i K  is the 
number of firms in the market for good i, and  i η  is the own-price elasticity of market 
demand. It is also worth remembering that the existence of an optimum requires that the 
                                                 
1Using the same ordering as in the table, the income elasticities are estimated to be 0.467, 0.498, 0.365, 
0.639, 0.687, 2.107 and 0.606 for the urban sector, and 0.648, 0.761, 0.440, 0.769, 0.729, 2.019 and 0.835 
for the rural sector.   17
elasticity itself is not only negative but also that  i i K / 1 − < η  (this condition collapses in 
the case of a monopoly to the classical condition that  1 − < i η ). 
  In order to compute (12) we have to specify the number of firms participating in 
each of the seven Cournot oligopolies. In the case of the market for corn tortilla, about 
half of its production is made after treating the corn kernels using an ancient technique 
called “nixtamalization”, while the other half is made using corn flour. The first 
production process is practiced by myriads of small producers and households across the 
country, while 70 percent of the supply of corn flour comes from a single company.
2 To 
represent that fact in our model, we assume that those two inputs are perfect substitutes, 
and that the firm faces a competition from the rest, so that  . 2 1 = K  It may be noted that, as 
implied by Table 1, the necessary condition  2 / 1 1 − < η  is not rejected at a 5% level of 
significance in the case of both the urban and the rural sectors. 
  Turning now to the processed meat market, we assume that  3 2 = K  given that 
there are three companies relatively equal in size that clearly control it. Another three 
firms used to control the chicken and eggs markets until very recently, when imports have 
brought some price discipline. Yet, in 2006, when the ENIGH was made,  3 3 = K  would 
still seem to be the most adequate value. It may also be noted that in the case of both 
processed meats and chicken and eggs the corresponding condition  3 / 1 − < i η  cannot be 
rejected. 
                                                 
2Since the names of the firms that have market power are irrelevant for the purposes of this paper, they have 
been omitted entirely. Nevertheless, they are available upon request from the author.   18
  In the case of milk, two companies control about 80% of the market, while the 
other 20% is geographically fragmented. Thus, for the simulation we take  2 4 = K  (note 
that the condition  2 / 1 4 − < η  also cannot be rejected, although barely in the urban sector, 
at a 5% level of significance). Regarding soft drinks, there is a firm that controls about 
two thirds of the Mexican market, and it has also been fined twice by the Mexican 
Federal Competition Commission for monopolic practices. Thus we set  , 1 5 = K  a value 
that is theoretically admissible, since, as shown in Table 1, the point estimates of the 
elasticities in both sectors are smaller than -1. 
  It would seem at first sight that the market for beer in Mexico constitutes the 
classical case of a duopoly since there are only two producers. However, the market is 
segmented geographically and prices are curiously identical among competing brands 
(from light beer to dark beer). For many observers of the industry this is a case of 
conscious parallelism; that is, it is an instance of tacit price-fixing between the two 
competitors. Thus, we choose  1 6 = K  for the simulation below (a value that is admissible 
according to Table 1). The final case, the market for medicines, is the most complex since 
there are several producers. Yet, except for the case of generic drugs, medicine prices in 
Mexico are considerably high according to international standards. Since the most 
favoured hypothesis to explain that phenomenon is once again conscious parallelism, we 
set 1 7 = K  (which is also admissible). 
  Using the values determined above, the own-price elasticities given in Table 1, 
and data on households’ income and spending, Table 2 presents estimates of the   19
distributive effects of market power. The results in the table are calculated after ordering, 
by deciles, urban or rural households according to their total monetary income (the lower 
the decile, the poorer the group). Next, using (12), it is estimated for each household the 
relative welfare loss due to market power in the seven markets, and after that it is 
computed an average of the losses among all households in each decile. Finally, those 
averages are expressed relative to the average of the decile that is affected the least by the 





Decile Relative loss Decile Relative loss
I 1.198 I 1.264
II 1.176 II 1.219
III 1.158 III 1.236
IV 1.134 IV 1.214
V 1.128 V 1.211
VI 1.109 VI 1.150
VII 1.073 VII 1.148
VIII 1.052 VIII 1.043
IX 1.036 IX 1.000
X 1.000 X 1.030
TABLE 2
WELFARE LOSS DUE TO MARKET POWER
Urban households Rural households
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  The estimates thus obtained are presented in the second and fourth columns of 
Table 2. The results suggest that in the urban sector the negative impact of monopoly 
power grows (in relative terms) as households become poorer. In the limit, the poorest 
households have a relative welfare loss about 19.8% higher than the one suffered by the 
richest. For the rural sector the redistributive impact is even more serious, since the first 
decile has a relative welfare loss of about 26.4% compared to the ninth decile, and of 
22.7% compared to the tenth decile.
3 
  Given the substantial redistributive effects arising from monopoly power, one 
could also wonder about its regional impacts across the 32 Mexican states. This can be 
accomplished using a similar procedure as the one mentioned earlier, except that now 
urban and rural households are classified by their home states, not by their incomes. 
Figure 1 illustrates the results thus obtained. The state with the smallest relative welfare 
loss turns out to be Baja California, which lies at the farthest north, while the state with 
the largest loss is Chiapas, at the farthest south. In fact, Chiapas’ relative welfare loss is 
2.77 times larger than Baja California’s. More generally, the southern states, many of 
which are Mexico's poorest, are those with the greatest welfare losses. What factors might 
explain these results? There are essentially two: the percentage of households that live in 
the rural sector in the case of each state, as well as the very diverse consumption patterns 
that exist in Mexico. For instance, a majority of rural households live in the south, and for 
them the most important component of their diet is corn tortilla. As a final point, it should 
                                                 
3As one would expect, the bootstrapped standard errors for the estimates in both columns turn out to be 
larger in the case of the rural sector. Furthermore, the null hypothesis that the relative welfare loss of rural 
households in the ninth decile is greater than the ones in the tenth decile can be rejected at a 5% level of 
significance.   22
be recalled that the ENIGH is representative only for some states, so that our last results 

















Low (<2.0)   24
obtained earlier. Yet, we think that this last exercise is worth presenting it, since a 
legislator would be even more concerned about the redistributive effects of market power 
if it just happened that her represented constituency were one of the most affected. 
 
CONCLUSION AND EXTENSIONS 
 
This work has presented evidence that the social losses due to the exercise of monopoly 
power in Mexico are not only significant, but also regressive, both across households and 
across Mexican states. It should be recalled that those results are based only on the study 
of goods markets, not of markets for services. These later markets are also interesting to 
examine, since, as opposed to the case of consumption goods, one would expect that the 
largest welfare losses due to market power would be suffered this time by the more 
affluent. Such an examination could be accomplished if one were willing to make two 
drastic assumptions: that the ENIGH could be treated as a longitudinal survey and that, 
following Frisch (1959), the underlying utility function could be deemed to be additive. 
Then, as illustrated in Urzúa (2009), one could obtain rough estimates of the price 
elasticities of services. 
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